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LAW, ETHICS, AND RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SQUARE: PRINCIPLES OF
RESTRAINT AND WITHDRAWAL
SAMUEL J. LEVINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have begun to recognize and discuss the
profound questions that arise in attempting to determine the place of
religion in the law and the legal profession. This discussion has emerged
on at least two separate yet related levels.
On one level, scholars have debated the place of religion in various
segments of the public sphere, including law and politics. As Professor
Steven Smith has put it, this debate "centers on the claim that it is im-
proper, or perhaps even unconstitutional, for government officials such
as legislators and judges, ... to rely on their religious convictions in
making political decisions."1 According to Professor Smith, this debate
began in 1988 and has since "become voluminous. "'
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1. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 203,203 (1998).
2. Id. at 203 n.1. Professor Smith credits Professor Kent Greenawalt with initiating this
debate. Id. at 203. Similarly, other scholars have described "an explosion of thought about
the role of religion in our law and politics." John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic
Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306 (1998). This began with Greenawalt's
1986 Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan Law School. See id. at 306 n.9.
Though by no means exhaustive, a list of some of the major works in this area might in-
clude STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS (1995) [hereinafter, GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1988) [hereinafter,
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997) [hereinafter, PERRY, RELIGION IN
POLITICS]; MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
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On a second and perhaps more personal level, lawyers have ex-
pressed the aim to place their professional values and obligations in the
context of their overriding religious obligations.3 Toward that goal, law-
yers have started to examine the relationship between professional val-
ues and religious values. These efforts have resulted in what Professor
Russell Pearce has called a "religious lawyering movement."
4
The aim of this Essay is to consider briefly one of the issues that
arises from viewing together these two levels of analysis. In particular,
the Essay looks to explore, from both an ethical and jurisprudential per-
spective, the question of how an individual might balance an interest in
identifying and articulating the proper role of religion in the public
square against the individual's own religious beliefs and commitments.
However, unlike the work of some scholars, the Essay does not start
from the premise that a religious individual would or should feel obliged
to advocate or decide issues of public concern based on religious princi-
ples. Instead, the Essay takes a step back and tries to examine some of
the ethical and intellectual options open to the religious individual, who
may or may not decide to employ religious arguments in public dis-
course. Elaborating on what Professor Kent Greenawalt has termed
"principles of restraint" or "principles of withdrawal,"5 the Essay fo-
cuses on three primary concerns that may lead a religious adherent to
the conclusion that it is preferable to avoid reliance on religious doctrine
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND
LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988); Symposium on Law and Morality, 1 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 1 (1984); Symposium: Religion and the Judicial Process: Legal,
Ethical, and Empirical Dimensions, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177 (1998); Symposium, The Role of
Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 (1993); Ruti Teitel,
A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
3. While not all religions or religious obligations may always be described as overriding,
this analysis focuses on hard cases in which an individual adheres to a religious system that,
the individual believes, prescribes a specific normative approach to an issue. Cf.
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 123 (describing a "typical modern
religious view" as "comprehensive," and stating that "[a]s a comprehensive view, a religious
perspective is not only broad in what it covers, its significance is overarching").
4. See Russell G. Pearce, Symposium: Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement:
An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
There have been discussions of the history and development of the movement, as well as ex-
amples of different stages of the movement. See id.; see also Samuel J. Levine, Introductory
Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values-Responding to the Problems of Ethical
Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Symposium: Faith and the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 911 (1996); Symposium: Lawyering and Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998);
Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Rep-
resent, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium: The Relevance of Religion to a Law-
yer's Work An Interfaith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
5. See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 123-25.
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in issues of public debate.
II. THREE REASONS FOR RESTRAINT
In 1988, I had the opportunity to participate in a symposium on the
death penalty at St. Mary's University School of Law.6 As a member of
a panel that considered religious approaches, I discussed capital pun-
ishment in Jewish law, and its possible application to the American legal
system. At several points in my presentation, I articulated my dis-
agreement with an approach that determines how Jewish law would pre-
scribe death sentences in the United States simply through an applica-
tion of the historical frequency of the death penalty in Jewish legal
history My view was premised on a recognition of the difficulties in-
volved in trying to apply principles from a system that is both religious
and legal in nature to the secular American legal system. At one point
of my presentation, for example, I noted that Jewish law views capital
punishment as contributing to the religious goals of repentance and
atonement. I posited that attempting to apply these religious principles
in support of the implementation of the death penalty in the United
States would be improper.9
6. See Symposium: Thoughts on Death Penalty Issues 25 Years After Furman v. Georgia,
29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its Application to
the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1040-41 (1998)
(critiquing such an approach offered by both the prosecutor and an appellate judge in Hayes
v. Lockhart, 852 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1988)).
8. See id. at 1042-43 & nn.19-24 (noting that although the Torah does prescribe the death
penalty for some offenses, "[o]ne of the central functions of capital punishment in the Biblical
justice system was to provide a means for the offender to atone for the capital offense.").
9. See id. at 1043 & nn.22-24.
Although the processes of repentance and atonement are inherent parts of the Jew-
ish legal system, that is clearly not the case in American penal law. Various ration-
ales have been offered to support the use of the death penalty in the American
criminal justice system, none of which justifies the death penalty on the grounds of
repentance. Any such theory would likely be discredited as a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, or as a legally improper reliance on religious concepts that have
no proper place in American legal thought.
Id. at 1043.
The Talmudic death penalty is unfathomable apart from atonement and ritual. The
American death penalty does not and cannot have, given the assumptions of our
constitutional order, any focus on ritual and atonement. It would probably be re-
versible error for a jury even to consider that by condemning a defendant to death,
they might be guaranteeing to him "a portion in the world to come."
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Following my presentation, a professor identifying herself as a
Catholic who, pursuant to her religious beliefs, advocated the abolition
of capital punishment in the United States approached me. She ex-
pressed both puzzlement at and disappointment in my reluctance to
adopt a normative approach to capital punishment in the United States
based on the treatment of the death penalty in the Jewish legal system.
In this section, responding in part to her questions, I attempt to map out
more broadly some of the reasons a religious adherent might choose not
to rely directly on doctrinal religious principles in analyzing contempo-
rary legal issues in the United States.
A. Normative Concerns
My initial response to the questioner at the symposium, and the one
I probably find most compelling, is that, on a normative level, I found it
unsettling to suggest that the United States should adopt laws based
primarily on direct reliance on a set of religious beliefs. In the case of
the death penalty, for example, it seems not only difficult but rather dis-
turbing to picture a judge" in the United States, deciding whether to im-
plement the death penalty based on that judge's view that Jewish law ei-
ther favors or opposes capital punishment." My primary concern with
this scenario is that such a decision would grant religion a measure of
normative authority inconsistent with and not recognized by the Ameri-
can legal system. 1
2
Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and American Death Penalty,
6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33,37 (1993).
For an illuminating theoretical attempt to apply the concept of atonement to American
law, see Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
10. The focus on judicial decision making in this section may be particularly helpful, as
the section deals with normative concerns, which figure most prominently and significantly in
the actions of judges.
11. The actual approach of Jewish law to capital punishment is complex. For discussions
of some of the complexities involved and some of the common misconceptions regarding this
approach, see Levine, supra note 7, at 1038-39 n.4-6 passim (citing sources); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on "Eye for Eye" and the Death
Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 509 n.12 passim (1998) (citing sources).
12. Cf. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 124. Professor Green-
walt suggests that a religious adherent:
might accept the principle of withdrawal.., as an actual requirement of justice,
given pluralist conditions. She might suppose that it is inappropriate for the state to
support a religion accepted by only one-sixth of the population, even when that sixth
happens to be right in its religious view. Such support would inadequately respect
freedom and consent as grounds of human community.
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A number of scholars have similarly expressed their disapproval of
judicial decisions that find primary justification in principles of religious
truth. According to Professor Greenawalt, for one, "[t]he government
of a liberal society knows no religious truth and a crucial premise about
a liberal society is that citizens of extremely diverse religious views can
build principles of political order and social justice that do not depend
on particular religious beliefs. 3 Likewise, Professor Michael Perry has
found that "legislators and other public officials, including judges,
should not rely on a religious premise in making a choice unless, in their
view, a persuasive secular premise supports the choice."
1 4
In addition, as Professor Scott Idleman has documented, "there may
be instances where a judge should be vulnerable to professional disci-
pline for [the] use (or misuse) of religion.., where such use jeopardizes
the apparent impartiality of [the] office or manifests a thorough disre-
gard for the rule of law."" Finally, again as a normative matter, primary
Id. at 124.
See also Ledewitz & Staples, supra note 9, at 37-38 ("Simply incorporating Talmudic practice
in the American legal system would not be coherent or possible. Nor would it make sense to
grant normative supremacy to the Talmud per se. The two systems are different; the two so-
cieties are different."); Randy Lee, A Look at God, Feminism, and Tort Law, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 369, 386 (1992) ("[T]here is something artificial in trying to inject Christian values into
the [American] legal system.").
13. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 2, at 216-17.
14. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 2, at 157 n.150. Cf. Frederick Schauer,
May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1986).
Perhaps implicit in the idea of a liberal democracy... is an obligation [on] an official
to rely on reasons not that necessarily are held by all of the people, but that could be
held by all of the people. Religious argument, to the extent that it intrinsically ap-
peals to and includes those who share common religious presuppositions while si-
multaneously excluding those who do not subscribe to certain religious tenets, may
very well fail this test.
Id.; see also Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
473, 492 (1996) ("[G]overnment may not make decisions that are themselves based on con-
tested religious beliefs that cannot be rationally supported, that privilege religious over secu-
lar beliefs, or that single out religious beliefs from among other nonrational beliefs for prefer-
ential treatment."); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy
Safer for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 501 (1998) ("I doubt I will be giving
too much away by first suggesting that religious reasons should not be deemed legitimate jus-
tifications for public policy. All laws should be justified by secular reasons accessible to all
citizens, whether religious or not."); but see Smith, supra note 1, at 217 (citing the argument
that "if judges may properly consult views of morality or philosophy outside the text, then
there is no good reason to restrict them from considering religious perspectives").
15. Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81
2000]
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reliance on religious grounds for a judicial ruling may prove an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Establishment Clause.16 According to Professor
Perry, "[t]he nonestablishment norm forbids-properly forbids, in my
view-government, including the judicial branch, to rely on a religious
premise in making a choice if no plausible secular premise supports the
choice. "'17
As a descriptive matter, this view of judicial decision making appears
to depict fairly accurately the extent to which judges rely on religious
beliefs to arrive at decisions. To be sure, there are numerous examples
of judicial opinions that cite religious principles in support of a ruling.18
Nevertheless, as Professor Greenawalt has noted, it is "highly unusual"
to find "direct reliance on a religious source to establish a moral propo-
sition of legal relevance."' 9 Instead, Greenawalt observes, "[a] judge
may refer to Christian tenets to help put a legal problem or doctrine, or
social attitudes, in a historical perspective. " 20 A judge, however, "is not
likely to say that an otherwise debatable legal conclusion is correct be-
cause it conforms to Christianity or some other supposedly true religious
understanding.
2 1
MARQ. L. REV. 537, 564 (1998). Likewise, as noted by scholars who have studied the conduct
of Catholic judges in capital cases, if a judge feels religiously prohibited from implementing
the death penalty, "[t]he legal system has a solution for this dilemma-it allows (indeed it re-
quires) the recusal of judges whose convictions keep them from doing their job." The authors
conclude that "t]his is a good solution." See Garvey & Coney, supra note 2, at 303.
16. See Idleman, supra note 15, at 553-55; GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, su-
pra note 2, at 66.
17. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 2, at 103 (emphasis in original).
18. See Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Mak-
ing, 68 Ind. L.J. 433 (1993).
19. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 207 n.2.
20. Id. at 142.
21. Id. As Greenawalt further explains,
most judges.., assume that basic differences among religious views are not resolv-
able on the basis of shared forms of reasoning. Thus, no particular religious view is
seen to be imbedded in the legal materials themselves or to be a part of some com-
mon understanding or technique of reason that stretches beyond the legal materials
but can be a source of guidance.
Id.; cf. United States v. Lynch, No. 96-6137, 1996 WL 717912, at **2 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 1996)
(rejecting argument based on natural law that it should nullify statute for "violat[ing] princi-
ples superior to the Constitution" and finding that "[u]nder Supreme Court precedent, well-
settled constitutional principles, and the rule of stare decisis, we decline to invalidate a federal
statute ... on the basis of natural law principles.").
Notably, at times even religious adherents who declare an intention to argue a legal posi-
tion based on religious grounds do not, in fact, rely primarily on arguments requiring accep-
[Vol. 83:773
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B. Practical Concerns
Even if a court did indeed deem it proper, as a normative matter, to
decide a legal issue through reliance on a religious understanding, such
an attempt would presumably face too many obstacles to prove practi-
cal. These obstacles offer an additional reason that a religious individ-
ual may not expect or even desire that a court adopt a particular legal
stance based on the substantive legal position of the adherent's religion.
As noted above, reliance on a religious position to decide a legal
question would apparently involve granting the religious position a
measure of legal authority. If such authority is an acknowledgment of
the status of religion as an expression of divine truth, the decision maker
who relies on religion would be required to choose between numerous
religious systems to arrive at a particular version of that truth. This dif-
ficulty is not limited merely to selecting a particular religious system,
such as "Judaism," "Christianity," or even "Catholicism." Many relig-
ions have complex approaches to difficult questions.'
A look at the approach of Jewish law to capital punishment is again
instructive. Contrary to common misconceptions evidenced by the
statements of prosecutors, judges, and others, this approach cannot
properly be portrayed through the generalization that Jewish law either
tance of the legal authority of their religious principles. Instead, while religion may be consis-
tent with, or even motivate, their political positions, their arguments are sometimes based
primarily in concepts more accessible and thus often more acceptable to nonadherents.
For example, when I participated in a panel on religious approaches to capital punish-
ment, the other two speakers were lawyers who had publicly and repeatedly identified them-
selves as Catholics who opposed the death penalty on religious grounds. However, while it
was clear from their presentations that their religious views informed their political positions
as well as their arguments, it also seemed that the force of their arguments revolved primarily
around concerns of morality not necessarily dependent on their substantive religious convic-
tions. See Kevin M. Doyle, A Catholic Lawyer's View of the Death Penalty, 29 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 949 (1998); Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Will Religious Teachings and International Law End
Capital Punishment?, 29 ST. MARY'S LJ. 957 (1998).
22. In addition, there often exist intradenomenational disputes over controversial issues.
Thus, reliance on a religious point of view may involve not only selecting a particular religious
system, but also deciding between different interpretations of that system-a decision that
courts have traditionally eschewed on constitutional and other grounds.
For discussions and critiques of the courts' approach, see Kent Greenawalt, Judicial
Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461 (1998); Kent Gre-
enawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998); Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-
Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85
(1997); Winfred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (1998).
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favors or opposes capital punishment.' Nevertheless, it is not uncom-
mon for prosecutors to invoke biblical verses simplistically and me-
chanically to support arguments in favor of the death penalty. 4 A less
common error relies on certain Talmudic sources to conclude that Jew-
ish law is almost absolutely opposed to the death penalty.' Both of
these positions fail to appreciate fully the complex legal and philosophi-
cal attitudes that contribute to the laws of capital punishment in the
Jewish legal system. Indeed, any attempt at an accurate application of
Jewish law to the American law of capital punishment would require a
sophisticated understanding of Jewish law. Such an attempt would re-
quire an analysis more nuanced than a direct reliance on substantive re-
ligious law to decide a question of American law. Instead, it would re-
quire a consideration of the conceptual foundations underlying the
approach of capital punishment in Jewish law, with the aim of identify-
ing and applying those that are suitable to the American legal debate."
23. See supra note 11. Similarly, scholars have written that:
Catholic teaching about capital punishment is fairly complicated .... In modem
Catholic teaching, capital punishment is often condemned along with other practices
whose point is the taking of life-abortion, euthanasia, nuclear war, and murder it-
self.... But a more precise statement of the church's teaching requires a few quali-
fications. The prohibitions against abortion and euthanasia (properly defined) are
absolute; those against war and capital punishment are not.
Garvey and Coney, supra note 2, at 306-07.
24. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 7, at 1040; Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 11, at
508-09 n.11; Daniel A. Rudolph, The Misguided Reliance in American Jurisprudence on Jew-
ish Law to Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437
(1996).
25. See Levine, supra 7, at 1040-41.
26. Therefore, my presentation at the symposium "focuse[d] on the conceptual under-
pinnings behind pertinent Jewish law, considering the potential relevance and effect of those
conceptualizations on American legal thought." Id. at 1039. Indeed, as I have suggested
elsewhere, "[certain] conceptual similarities between American law and Jewish law allow for
meaningful yet cautious comparison of the two systems." See Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal
Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441,444 (1997).
Such an approach precludes only the assumption that religious thought should be
granted inherent legal authority in the American legal system. It does not prevent considera-
tion of the logic and value of religious positions when they are helpful in American legal
analysis. Therefore, according to this approach, a proposal such as that of Professor Steven
Smith, who suggested an alternative to the traditional rule of damages through a system based
largely in religious thought, would be considered on the basis of the merits of its logic and ef-
ficacy. See Smith, supra note 1, at 221-27. See also Lee, supra note 12, at 386-407.
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
C. Tactical Concerns
Finally, aside from other concerns, a religious adherent may prefer
to avoid reliance on religious arguments in public discourse for largely
tactical reasons.' Marc Stern, who identifies himself as an Orthodox
Jew, has thoughtfully described some of the difficult ethical questions he
confronts in reconciling his religious principles with his work as a public
interest lawyer.' According to Stern, "often the hardest question, even
if one concludes that religious dictates require a particular position, [is]
whether it is appropriate to ask the government to undertake to man-
date (or forbid) that practice."'29 Stern refines the question as "whether
it is wise to do so; whether it is in the interest of any particular faith to
take advantage of a minority political constellation to further its posi-
tion. "3 He recommends a consideration of how "such an action [would]
affect the general tolerance of society."'" For example, Stern suggests,
"[a] faith might gain the religious benefit of stopping abortion.., but
only at tremendous cost to the social fabric, and to the live-and-let-live
atmosphere which has allowed religion to flourish."32
27. This part of the discussion assumes that the religious adherent is in the position, de-
scribed by Greenawalt, in which "one's religious convictions call for certain practices" and
"one thinks the practices should be instituted." GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, su-
pra note 2, at 123. In a different scenario, "one's religious views may not speak directly about
political organization and justice. One may think the main techniques for deciding these is-
sues need not rely on religious premises themselves and are compatible with a wide variety of
religious premises ...... Id at 124. But see Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public
Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13,
20 (1984). Cuomo states that:
the Catholic Church's actions with respect to the interplay of religious values and
public policy make clear that there is no inflexible moral principle which determines
what our political conduct should be. For example, on divorce and birth control,
without changing its moral teachings, the Church abides [by] the civil law as it now
stands, thereby accepting, without making much of a point of it, that in our plural-
istic society we are not required to insist that all our religious values be the law of
the land.
Id.; see also Garvey & Coney, supra note 2, at 306 (stating that "it is not possible to say, as
some might suppose, that members of the Catholic Church are simply bound by their faith to
follow the Church's teaching on" capital punishment).
28. See Marc D. Stem, The Attorney as Advocate and Adherent: Conflicting Obligations
of Zealousness, 27 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1363 (1996).
29. Id, at 1372.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Advocates of such a position might draw an analogy to the importance of various
constitutional protections that, at times, require undesirable results such as freeing of some-
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While Stem's depiction of the dangers to religion and society that
might result from a ban on abortion may seem exaggerated to some, he
offers sound advice to religious adherents and in particular to religious
minorities. As Mario Cuomo has eloquently put it:
[T]o assure our freedom we must allow others the same freedom,
even if occasionally it produces conduct by them which we would
hold to be sinful.
I protect my right to be a Catholic by preserving your right to
believe as a Jew, a Protestant or non-believer, or as anything else
you choose. We know the price of seeking to force our beliefs on
others is that they might some day force theirs on us. This free-
dom is the fundamental strength of our unique experiment in
government. In the complex interplay of forces and considera-
tions that go into the making of our laws and policies, its preser-
vation must be a pervasive and dominant concern. 3
As both Stern and Cuomo clearly recognize, a successful campaign
by religious adherents for governmental endorsement of one religious
position might prove a Pyrrhic victory if it likewise allows the govern-
ment to choose other positions antithetical to the religious views of
those adherents?4
III. CONCLUSION
In analyzing the proper place of religion in law and politics, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that religious adherents may not always seek to
invoke religious principles in matters of public debate. Likewise, it is
important to recognize that an adherent's decision not to rely on relig-
ious principles does not necessarily indicate that the adherent is any less
committed to those principles than are others who refer to religion in
one who actually committed a crime, but, more significantly, serve as indispensable guaran-
tors of freedom for all members of society.
33. Cuomo, supra note 27, at 16
34. Professor Greenawalt describes a related but slightly different scenario in which a
religious adherent
would think it preferable for the government to support the true religion, which is
accepted by only one-sixth of the people; however, realizing that she and her cobe-
lievers do not have the political clout to achieve this result, [she] is willing to settle
for the government keeping its hands off religion.
See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 2, at 124.
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advocating or selecting a legal position. There are a number of reasons
a religious individual might prefer to avoid employing references to re-
ligious principles in the public square, out of respect for both the law
and religion itself.
At the same time, Marc Stem offers valuable advice for the individ-
ual lawyer, for whom "the policy of tolerance has real personal costs."
Stern cautions that
[t]olerance on large public issues too readily becomes moral in-
difference. It is hard, and may be disingenuous, to insist that
while I am opposed to abortion, and regard it (at least in many
cases) as an unspeakable moral wrong, I am prepared to tolerate
abortion in the name of other goods. This involves a weighing of
competing harms, in which it is often too easy to downgrade the
particular religious norm in favor of tolerance .... '
Such ethical and intellectual honesty appears to be essential in facing
the difficult questions confronting the religious individual attempting to
determine the proper role of religious beliefs in the public square.
35. See Stem, supra note 28, at 1373; cf. Cuomo, supra note 27, at 22, 23 (endorsing "a
measured attempt to balance moral truths against political realities," but insisting that "we
should not be forced to mold Catholic morality to conform to disagreement by non-Catholics,
however sincere or severe their disagreement").
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